«... the purposes of international law governing force is concerned with the protection of peoples and the preservation of peace, a sentiment echoed in Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter extended beyond relations among States by the phrase “or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. In the enumeration of purposes of the United Nations, Article 1 paragraph 1 affirms the obligation to resolve disputes by peaceful means “in conformity with the principles of justice and international law”. These provisions, if read in the light of the Preamble to the Charter, clearly condition an assessment of any use of force in international relations that extends beyond the limits of territorial sovereignty. The decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case extended this reasoning with regard to the inhibitions on defensive claims to use force to general international law beyond the framework of the Charter. With regard to Gaza there is a further concern with respect to the nature of the legal obligations of Israel towards the Gazan population. Israel officially contends that after the implementation of its disengagement plan in 2005 it is no longer an occupying power, and therefore is not responsible for observance of the obligations set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention. That contention has been widely rejected by expert opinion, by the de facto realities of effective control.
... Not every violation of human rights or infraction of the Geneva conventions constitutes a war crime or a crime of State. Moreover, criminal intent, by way of mental attitude or through circumstantial evidence, must be established. In essence, “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions as defined in article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention normally provide a legal foundation for allegations of war crimes. It is to be noted that the role of international criminal law is to identify and implement the fundamental obligations of international humanitarian law in wartime, but also to take account of severe violations of human rights arising from oppressive patterns of peacetime governance.
... The most important legal issue raised by an investigation of the recent military operations concerns the basic Israeli claim to use modern weaponry on a large scale against an occupied population living under the confined conditions that existed in Gaza. This involves trying to establish whether, under the conditions that existed in Gaza, it is possible with sufficient consistency to distinguish between military targets and the surrounding civilian population. If it is not possible to do so, then launching the attacks is inherently unlawful, and would seem to constitute a war crime of the greatest magnitude under international law. On the basis of the preliminary evidence available, there is reason to reach this conclusion.
... There is no way to reconcile the general purposes and specific prescriptions of international humanitarian law with the scale and nature of the Israeli military attacks commenced on 27 December 2008. The Israeli attacks with F-16 fighter bombers, Apache helicopters, long-range artillery from the ground and sea were directed at an essentially defenceless society of 1.5 million persons. As recent reports submitted to the Council by the Special Rapporteur emphasized, the residents of Gaza were particularly vulnerable to physical and mental damage from such attacks as the society as a whole had been brought to the brink of collapse by 18 months of blockade that restricted the flow of food, fuel, and medical supplies to sub-subsistence levels and was responsible, according to health specialists, for a serious overall decline in the health of the population and of the health system. Any assessment under international law of the attacks of 27 December should take into account the weakened condition of the Gazan civilian population resulting from the sustained unlawfulness of the pre-existing Israeli blockade that violated articles 33 (prohibition on collective punishment) and 55 (duty to provide food and health care to the occupied population) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Considering the obligation of the occupying Power to care for the well-being of the civilian occupied population, mounting a comprehensive attack on a society already weakened by unlawful occupation practices would appear to aggravate the breach of responsibility described in the above owing to the difficulties of maintaining the principle of distinction. The deputy head of the embassy of Israel at the European Union, Ambassador Zvi Tal, during discussions with a committee of the European Parliament, sought to defend the attacks on Gaza by describing them as addressing “a very peculiar situation.” In responding to allegations about the bombing of United Nations schools in Gaza, he was quoted as saying: “Sometimes in the heat of fire and the exchange of fire, we do make mistakes. We're not infallible.” This is deeply misleading in its characterization of the war zone. It is not a matter of mistakes and fallibility, but rather a massive assault on a densely populated urbanized setting where the defining reality could not but subject the entire civilian population to an inhumane form of warfare that kills, maims and inflicts mental harm that is likely to have long-term effects, especially on children that make up more than 50 per cent of the Gazan population.
... It is a requirement of international customary law, as well as of the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2 paragraph 4 interpreted in the light of Article 1 paragraph 1 that recourse to force to resolve an international dispute should be a last resort after the exhaustion of diplomatic remedies and peaceful alternatives, even in circumstances where a valid claim of self-defence exists, absent a condition of urgency, assuming for the moment that an occupying power can ever claim a right of self-defense.
... In the course of events preceding the attacks of 27 December, the breakdown of the truce followed a series of incidents on 4 November in which Israel killed a Palestinian in Gaza, mortars were fired from Gaza in retaliation, and then an Israeli air strike was launched that killed an additional six Palestinians in Gaza; in other words, the breakdown of the ceasefire seems to have been mainly a result of Israeli violations, although this offers no legal, moral or political excuse for firing of rockets aimed at civilian targets, which itself amounts to a clear violation of international humanitarian law.
... The continuing refusal of Israel to acknowledge Hamas as a political actor, based on the label of “terrorist organization” has obstructed all attempts to implement human rights and address security concerns by way of diplomacy rather than through reliance on force. This refusal is important for reasons already mentioned ..., namely, that the population density in Gaza means that reliance on large-scale military operations to ensure Israeli security cannot be reconciled with the legal obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention to protect to the extent possible the safety and well-being of the occupied Gazan population.
... the contention that the use of force by Israel was “disproportionate” should not divert our attention from the prior question of the unlawfulness of recourse to force. If for the sake of argument, however, the claim of self-defence and defensive force is accepted, it would appear that the air, ground, and sea attacks by Israel were grossly and intentionally disproportionate when measured against either the threat posed or harm done, as well as with respect to the disconnect between the high level of violence relied upon and the specific security goals being pursued. This legal sentiment is authoritatively expressed in Article 51(5)(b) of the Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, in which prohibited disproportionate attacks are defined as “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Israel did little to disguise its deliberate policy of disproportionate use of force, thereby acknowledging a refusal to comply with this fundamental requirement of international customary law.
... In an unprecedented belligerent policy, Israel refused to allow the entire civilian population of Gaza, with the exception of 200 foreign wives, to leave the war zone during the 22 days of attack that commenced on 27 December. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated on 6 January 2009, Gaza is “the only conflict in the world in which people are not even allowed to flee.” ... International humanitarian law has not specifically and explicitly at this time anticipated such an abuse of civilians, but the policy as implemented would suggest the importance of an impartial investigation to determine whether such practices of “refugee denial” constitute a crime against humanity as understood in international criminal law. The initial definition of crimes against humanity, developed in relation to the war crimes trials after the Second World War, is “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts done against any civilian population”. More authoritative is the definition contained in Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, according to which crimes against humanity includes “inhumane acts (…) intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Refugee denial under these circumstances of confined occupation is an instance of “inhumane acts”, during which the entire civilian population of Gaza was subjected to the extreme physical and psychological hazards of modern warfare within a very small overall territory. It should be kept in mind that this restriction on free movement, to escape from the war zone, was imposed on a population already severely weakened by the effects of the blockade. ... the law of war and international human rights law, for the sake of the protection of civilian innocence in wartime situations, needs to affirm the right of every non-combatant civilian to become a refugee, or at least to have the right to seek such a status, especially if the conditions for an internal “refugee” option are not present.
... The underlying claim of Israel that it was acting in self-defence be evaluated in relation to the contention that such an attack violated Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and amounted to an act of aggression under the circumstances, and whether the reliance on disproportionate use of force or the inherently indiscriminate nature of the military campaign should be treated as a criminal violation of international customary and treaty law. There exists here a complex and unresolved issue as to whether an occupying power can claim “self-defence” in relation to an occupied society, and whether its use of force, even if excessive, and of a border-crossing variety, can be regarded as “aggression”. ... the criminality of aggressive war established at Nuremberg remains firmly established in international customary law and its bearing on contested uses of force remains authoritative. This is an important issue that casts a shadow over the entire controversy about the Israeli attacks, and should be clarified to the extent possible in the inquiry report.
... The crimes described in the London Agreement establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945 were subsequently confirmed as part of customary international law by the International Law Commission in 1950 under the rubric of “Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal”.9 These principles are treated by most international law experts as constituting “peremptory norms” as defined in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1988): “A peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Thus, if the Nuremberg categories of criminality qualify as peremptory norms embedded in international customary law, these crimes remain valid and relevant for the purpose of assessing the Israeli attacks under the labels of “crimes against peace”, “war crimes”, and “crimes against humanity”. Reliance on the relevance of these crimes, especially crimes against peace, is singularly important to allow assessment of the underlying allegation that the Israeli attacks commencing on 27 December 2008 were intrinsically criminal because of their incapacity to maintain the distinction between military and civilian targets, a contention that Israeli political and military leaders challenge. If a solid basis in fact and evidence could be provided to back up this contention, it would provide the grounds for contending that the highest political and military leaders could potentially be held criminally responsible. Alleged crimes associated with battlefield operations and command policy, such as the targeting of schools, mosques, ambulances, residential homes and health facilities, should be investigated to the extent possible, including evidence pertaining to the existence of deliberate intent or gross negligence.
... At the conclusion of the present report, it seems appropriate to reaffirm the connection between Israeli security concerns and the Palestinian right of self-determination. As long as Palestinian basic rights continue to be denied, the Palestinian right of resistance to occupation within the confines of international law and in accord with the Palestinian right of self-determination is bound to collide with the pursuit of security by Israel under conditions of prolonged occupation. In this respect, a durable end to violence on both sides requires an intensification of diplomacy with a sense of urgency, and far greater resolve by all parties to respect international law, particularly as it bears on the occupation as set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the time has long passed for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) requiring Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territories, for Israel to close unlawful settlements, desist from efforts to alter the demographics of East Jerusalem, respect the advisory opinion on the Wall of the International Court of Justice of 2004, and bring the occupation to a genuine end, either through negotiations or by unilateral action.
